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Introduction 
 
Following deregulation of the principal energy markets, and EU failure to 
impose harmonised taxation on polluting emissions, some European 
countries have moved towards market based greening of energy supply by 
facilitating various forms of green certificate trade. 
 The motivation behind this development is complex and includes: 
• expectations of higher cost efficiency under market based than plan 
based greening; 
• expectations of innovation and development of new technologies 
and business models under protected learning in the new green 
certificate arenas; 
• expectations of predominantly national and local industrial returns 
from the technology development outlined above; 
• expectations that the green markets will efficiently enhance a 
sustainable development of the energy system. 
 
The recursion to market based greening is demanding, however, as political 
authorities thereby engage extensively not only in market regulation, but also 
in market construction, even to the extent of taking responsibility for 
creating demand and balancing it with sufficient supply. Because of the 
design challenge and the goal complexity, green electricity market 
development therefore appears to involve considerable policy learning. The 
regulation and market construction itself, thus, contains strong elements of 
innovation. In this way policy innovation comes to interplay with the 
technological and commercial innovation of market actors that it is supposed 
to bring about. 
Interplay between policy and commercial/technological innovation 
is not without complication, however, and raises several challenges. To shed 
light on the challenges of electricity market greening by market design, the 
paper explores some of the European variants through an analysis of the 
Dutch green certificate-, the UK renewable obligation- and the Swedish el-
certificate model. It presents brief descriptions of the three green electricity 
trade systems including such features as stages of development, market 
organisation, actors, contracts and market function. 
On the basis of these descriptions, the report discusses challenges 
and success factors in green market design. 
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Summary 
 
This report explores some of the drivers behind this development and 
describes and analyses experiences in the Dutch, UK and Swedish green 
electricity markets. 
The report points out that the recursion to market based greening is 
demanding, as political authorities thereby engage extensively not only in 
market regulation, but also in market construction, even to the extent of 
taking responsibility for creating demand and balancing it with sufficient 
supply. Because of the design challenge and the goal complexity, green 
electricity market development therefore appears to involve considerable 
policy learning and regulation and market construction itself, thus, contains 
strong elements of innovation. The report, therefore, shows how policy 
innovation comes to interplay with the technological and commercial 
innovation of market actors, that it is supposed to bring about. 
 
The Rise and Fall of the Dutch Green Power Market 
The Dutch support system for green power has attracted much interest, both 
because of its new and challenging choice of support schemes as well as for 
its continuous changes in the regulatory design. 
The Netherlands saw the emergence of the first green power certificate 
market in Europe as well as the first green market to open up to imported 
certificates and therewith to pay a premium to green power generated outside 
national borders. Renewable electricity was stimulated by a combination of 
consumption incentive (ecotax exemption) and production incentive 
(production subsidy). Electricity suppliers collected the ecotax (REB) from 
conventional electricity customers. Green electricity customers paid a 
premium for the green electricity but were exempted from the ecotax (REB), 
which offset the green premium 
However, as the report points out, the Dutch green electricity market 
also illustrates the challenges of a pioneering and unilateral strategy that 
ultimately had to be abandoned. A major problem with the Dutch regulatory 
system for renewable electricity was that it was continuously changing. 
These changes not only concerned the design of support schemes, but also 
the market actors and/or policy makers involved as well. 
Because of the overwhelming availability of hydropower in 
“reciprocal countries” and its eligibility, not only for the ecotax exemption 
but also for the generation subsidy, the Netherlands experienced a huge 
inflow of green certificates from already existing hydropower plants. This 
led to a political reaction. 
 11
The change from a regime based on fiscal incentives to a regime 
based on generator subsidy also implied that the bulk of the payment was 
directly given to the producer, thus skipping the energy supplier out of the 
loop. This has resulted in much confusion since it required renegotiations of 
all existing contracts that had been established during the old subsidy regime 
or its predecessor.  
 
The Renewable Obligation Order in the UK 
The Renewables Obligation Order (RO) in the UK has also been one of the 
few operative market based certificate schemes in Europe. The RO imposes 
the obligation on licensed suppliers to either source a certain and growing 
percentage of their electricity from renewables or to pay a certain amount 
into the so called buyout fund. The buyout fund is then redistributed to the 
suppliers who have met their obligations by redeeming ROCS. 
 The report describes the basic functions of the RO scheme and 
descirbes its major challenges including such issues as: competition issues, 
credit risk and regulatory risk: 
 As far as competition is concerned, the paper points out that a few 
large incumbents dominate the UK retail market for electricity and that the 
same players also dominate the demand for ROCS.  
As far as credit risk is concerned, the biggest setback for the RO 
came from the credit problem within the buyout pool which was only 
recognised after two major company failures. The paper shows how 
proposals were tabled to mutualise at least a part of this risk across all 
suppliers. 
In addition to the commercial risk from shortfall in the buyout fund 
and possible liquidity and structural problems in the RECS market. The 
paper also discusses the problem of regulatory risk including concern about 
uncertainty of future quota levels, concerns about overriding drivers behind 
government policy and concerns about overriding intervention by EU 
policies. 
The paper also discusses the challenges of conflicting industrial 
interests. It is shown how renewable generators, such as the Renewable 
Power Association and the Wind Energy Association, are, for instance, 
pushing for ambitious policies and restrictions. Traditional energy-industrial 
actors on the other hand more inclined to support moderation and softer 
approaches, such as extensive co-firing where bio fuels are mixed with 
traditional fuels in modified conventional burners. 
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The Swedish Elcert Model 
The Swedish elcert model has also attracted international interest It was was 
introduced to stimulate generation of electricity from renewable energy 
sources 
The introduction of electricity certificates implied a regime shift in 
Swedish support policy for renewables, away from fixed subsidies towards 
market based support. The Swedish certificate model is based on an 
obligation for electricity users, with some exceptions, to buy a certain 
number of certificates, depending on their total consumption, their so-called 
quota obligation. For ordinary households the electricity retailer, in most 
cases, handles the obligation. In 2003, the quota obligation was set at 7,4% 
of electricity consumption. This quota obligation will successively be 
increased, up to 2010 to 16,9% on a yearly basis. If the quota obligation is 
not met, the quota-responsible must pay a levy to the state.  
In spite of reasonable technical performance, the report shows how a 
number of concerns have been raised about the Swedish elcert market. A 
major concern has been with the ability of the market to drive investments in 
new technology. 
Concerns have also been raised about market transparency and 
strategic behaviour. The report also points out that there have been several 
discussions about windfall profits for paper and pulp industry where energy 
generation served as part of waste management and self-supply of electricity. 
Nevertheless, the report points out, the new certificate market has provided a 
new focus on energy generation as an attractive business area. 
Challenges and Opportunities 
The report identifies several challenges and opportunities: 
 In all three cases, practice from competition authorities so far has 
been to go soft on green markets, as they are in an initial build-up-phase. 
Nevertheless, there is probably a limit to how long such de-facto amnesty 
from competition law could last without giving rise to serious questioning. 
Like for the underlying electricity markets, internationalisation might be 
necessary to cope with the structural challenge. 
 Furthermore, the report discusses how the challenge of dynamic 
learning and quickly changing framework conditions was a particular 
challenge in the Dutch case: Startled by the rapid developments of the 
market, the report points out that policy makers decided at a too early stage 
to evaluate and revise the market system. The market and its players did not 
have sufficient time to properly respond to the new market conditions. 
 The report points out that the English and the Swedish green 
electricity markets have not seen comparable dramatic shifts in regulatory 
design. Nevertheless, the report documents that in both cases, there have 
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been industrial concerns with open-ended policy positions and lack of long-
term government commitment.  
 The report also shows how green certificates through quotas may 
have effects on the traditional electricity markets that are not trivial to 
overview. The el-certificate system can be said to have a price-limiting 
effect on the basic power market, if the renewable electricity displaces 
expensive marginal electricity generation. However, this effect has to be 
balanced off against the increased costs of higher green el quotas, which at a 
certain point will outweigh the price fall in the regular electricity market 
 The report shows that another major challenge with market-based 
instruments is that they trigger strategic industrial adaptation. On the one 
hand such triggering carries large dynamic potential for mobilisation of 
resources to reach environmental policy goals. On the other hand they also 
imply a risk of unforeseen side effects 
In the comparative analysis, the report also points out the 
paradoxical European diversity in market design. While the non-compliance 
fine in the UK market sets an upper limit to price formation, the Swedish 
elcert system, is much more vulnerable to imbalances in the supply and 
demand. Since the price ceiling is set at 150% of the average market price 
over the year, gross imbalances could have dramatic effects. Swedish policy-
makers are therefore under strong pressure to set the certificate demand at a 
realistic level. The UK and Sweden have also pursued widely different 
policies on inter-period trading. 
 Finally, the report also discusses lessons to be learnt from the three 
market experiences. This includes an argument for transparency, simplicity 
and recursion to known model that we argue, may help provide the necessary 
assurance. The report also argues for well-conceptualised symmetry 
conditions between integrated market systems as another necessary pre-
condition for a well functioning European market. 
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Chapter I 
Analytical Reflections on Design Challenges 
 
Constructing green markets involves internalisation of environmental 
damage or negative external effects into the business model and into the 
regulatory market design. The focus is on how economic incentives can be 
built into the market, so as to introduce a trade-off for the firms between net 
private benefits and marginal environmental costs (Turner & Pearce 1990). 
Building pollution controls, environmental management and product 
stewardship into the organisational design of the firm thus becomes the 
responsibility of the firm in response to market incentives and regulatory 
pressure that provides privileged resource allocation to ecologically oriented 
niche markets  
 However, such market construction involves a number of design 
challenges. Firstly, the degree to which viable markets may be rationally 
designed is debated and rational design models are actively challenged by 
learning models. Secondly, the goal and design criteria are also debated, 
notably how to balance static and dynamic efficiency concerns. Thirdly, 
distributive issues across national boundaries - usually denoted “industrial 
policy” and between domestic interests raises complex stakeholder concerns. 
Finally, the degree of policy intervention in itself poses a challenge, as deep 
and comprehensive regulatory engagement raises an extended coordination 
challenge. 
 This chapter explores each of these issues in some further detail 
 
Rationalism versus Learning 
Constructing green markets involves a fundamental policy design challenge, 
as it entails setting of framework conditions for dynamic commercial 
development, yet at the same time involves policy learning and 
experimentation which potentially changes the same framework conditions 
over time.  
The classical mode of regulation is for the policy-maker to take a 
strong rationalist position, characterised by a dominant belief in deductive 
theoretical analysis. Based on strong a priori optimization logic and 
simplistic behavioural models within a well-defined functional scheme, this 
analysis, in many cases allows clear prediction of outcomes and clear 
deduction of optimal policies and strategies.  
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While practice according to this regulatory ideal type may occur in 
some cases of simple market adjustment, it is unlikely for more complex 
market intervention, not so speak of complete market redesign. This is 
recognised even within the circle of game theoretical market-designers that 
therefore find it necessary to subscribe to a medium or weak deductive-
rationalist position (Roth 1999, Milgrom 2000). The reasons given for the 
retreat to a weaker rationalist position is that practical design carries with it a 
responsibility for detail that confounds the simple models and deductive 
analytical methods that characterise most game-theoretic analysis in the 
economic literature. As argued by Roth (1999), complexity of the strategic 
environment itself, as well as complexity of participants’ behaviour carries 
with it variety that transcends even very sophisticated regulation theory. One 
set of approaches to complexity and limited information, within the 
rationalist tradition, has been to develop regulatory strategies that elicit 
knowledge about actors’ strategies and then feed this into revision of the 
regulatory model. This mode of dynamic regulation has often been termed 
the “menu of contract” approach, since eliciting of strategic information 
takes place through the commercial actors’ choices among a set of regulatory 
contracts. Since the contracts allow the actors to make different profit under 
different efficiency performance, their choice of contracts implicitly reveals 
their efficiency potential. This information is then used to redesign the 
regulatory contracts for the next period and so on. Through successive 
regulatory games, the regulator, in this way, seeks to elicit the innovation 
potential from the market actors and then revise his position. 
Departing more radically from the rationalist position, a learning 
school of regulation argues that dynamic complexity entails a more 
fundamental learning approach from the regulator.  
 
One of the most radical formulations of the learning approach to regulation 
is the so-called transition management approach, spear-headed by the Dutch 
government in practice and developed analytically by Dutch scholars (Kemp 
et al 2001, 2003; Rotmans et al 2000, 2001). Transition management breaks 
with the planning and implementation model and policies aimed at achieving 
particular outcomes. It is based on a different, more process-oriented 
philosophy, whereby deliberate attempts are made to bring about structural 
change in a stepwise manner. Transition management is a form of process 
management against a set of goals set by society whose problem solving 
capabilities are mobilized and translated into a transition programme, which 
is legitimized through the political process. 
A transition management approach to regulation consists of a set of 
connected changes in technology, the economy, institutions, behaviour, 
culture, ecology and belief systems that reinforce each other. Within a 
transition there is multiple causality and co-evolution of independent 
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developments (Rotmans et al. 2000 and 2001). By engaging in “contex 
control” transition management orients market dynamics towards societal 
goals. 
Transition management is best viewed as a form of soft planning or 
indicative planning, where regulation/ policy interventions are evaluated 
against two types of criteria:  1) the immediate contribution to policy goals; 
and 2) the contribution of the policies to the overall transition process. 
 
Regulatory Design under Static versus Dynamic Efficiency 
The difference between rationalist versus the learning approach to regulation 
partly hinges upon differences in a static efficiency versus a dynamic 
efficiency point of departure. The rationalist perspective typically takes a 
static efficiency point of departure. Although dynamic efficiency 
considerations are increasingly included in rationalist regulation, this is done 
as a secondary supplementary element to the traditional static efficiency 
point of departure. The learning perspective on the other hand starts the other 
way round with a strong anchoring in the Austrian tradition in economics 
and in innovation theory (Vaughn 2001), which features much weaker 
rationality assumptions.  
The Market-efficiency Perspective 
The core focus of the market efficiency perspective is on efficient allocation 
of economic resources between alternative deployments in an economy 
where both economic resources and technologies are given and scarce. The 
typical method employed is optimisation, and the fundament of an extensive 
theoretical framework is the welfare theorem postulating that a competitive 
market based on the free trade solution is Pareto-optimal (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 2005). 
In organisation theory March’s (1991) concept of exploitation 
covers a similar cognitive orientation, characterised by a focus on 
refinement, choice, efficiency, selection, implementation and execution. 
The action programme or core policy instruments in this perspective 
are market exposure, competition policy and regulatory design that foster 
competitive pressure and cost efficiency. Within organisations this approach 
fosters combinations of internal competitive incentives and tight 
programming of efficient routines with a cost minimisation focus (figure 
I.1). 
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Figure I.1: The Market Efficiency Perspective6 
 
 
 
 
The innovation/exploration perspective 
The innovation/exploration perspective sees environmental reorientation of 
the energy system as a question not only of efficiency, but also of 
technological change.  
The core focus of this model is on development and growth as a 
function of innovation. Competitive pressure is also here of central 
importance, but then as a force to stimulate creativity and not cost 
minimization (Edquist 2001; Lundvall 2002) (figure I.2).  
In organisation theory March’s (1991) concept of exploration covers 
the orientation characterised by a focus on variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, flexibility, discovery and innovation. 
Core policy instruments within this perspective are support of 
research and development combined with facilitation of industrial learning 
environments that support innovation and technological learning. The aim is 
to elicit new technical solutions and to stimulate promising already operative 
technologies to cut costs and increase performance through protected niche 
markets and the associated learning curves (OECD 2003).  
 
 
                                                     
6 Following Lakatosh we distinguish between the cognitive core and the adaptive translation 
of the core into “realistic” propositions and/or normative policies 
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Figure I. 2  The innovation/exploration perspective 
 
 
 
 
Like for individual firms, the regulatory regime has to strike careful balances 
between static and dynamic efficiency concerns. Continuing the firm 
analogy, the striking of this balance implies taking complementary policy 
instruments into use, just as the firm often handles the dual task by 
developing specialized organizational tools. 
 
Regulatory Design and the Distributive Dimension 
 
In addition to the static-versus dynamic challenge, distributive issues also 
feature prominently in regulatory design. Again, with analogy to business 
strategy, we may speak of a stakeholder or a conflict of interest dimension. 
In the case of regulation, this is perhaps most prominently displayed in 
international distributive concerns, reflected in industrial policy, but also in 
distributive concerns between various intra-national stakeholders 
 
Industrial Policy  
The core focus of the industrial policy perspective is on building up and 
maintaining industrial capabilities within the territorial domain in focus. 
Industrial competition on a global scale is therefore partly defined in 
mercantilist terms as a race between national/regional champions (whether at 
a firm or industrial sector level). The role of public policy is to provide the 
partnership and nurturing context for the national champion and/or to build 
P
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Action programme
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regulation
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or support strong industrial clusters within promising sectors with national 
location. 
 While the pure market efficiency perspective is neutral to national 
championship, the industrial policy model is likely to favour the use of 
market/efficiency pressures as long as strategic domestic industry prospers. 
The industrial policy perspective may also be linked to the innovation/ 
exploration perspective, but only to the extent that it stimulates technological 
development favourable to national/regional industrial development (figure 
I.3).  
 
 
Figure I.3:  The industrial policy perspective 
 
 
Social Acceptability  
In the intra-national context, the pressure of democratic legitimacy dictates 
that social acceptability be a major design criterium for policy solution. 
From this point of view, the concept of social equilibrium is introduced as an 
additional criterion to the neoclassical concept of economic equilibrium. 
Successful policies emerge only in those situations where both criteria 
overlap (figure I.4) 
 Some pure economic market solutions with a high degree of economic 
efficiency may imply socially unacceptable distributive effects and not 
qualify on the social criteria. On the other hand, solutions where the 
economic realities are neglected would be examples of unilateral socio-
political equilibria where economic efficiency conditions are not met. 
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Figure I.4:  Social and economic equilibria 7 
 
To the extent that regulatory design must accommodate international and 
intra-national distribution, a stakeholder dimension sets boundaries and 
premises for both static efficiency and dynamic efficiency concerns. 
 
 
The Challenge of Deep Regulatory Intervention 
Green electricity markets and similar quasi-market constructions represent 
some of the most ambitious engagements as they include both design of the 
basic trading mechanisms, as well as the constitution of demand and/or 
supply preferences. This model of market-intervention thereby includes the 
fundamental motivation for exchange as an object for strategic public policy 
design. 
In the opposite end of the policy spectrum, market adjustment 
constitutes perhaps the least radical form of public intervention. Through 
government intervention already existing markets are adjusted to function 
better and/or include new concerns. This adds an administrative restriction to 
the general exchange regime, but basically leaves the regime intact within 
this restriction. An example would be environmental taxes to introduce 
externality costs. 
A step further in policy complexity, but still short of the full market 
construction is de-regulation or opening up planned economy/regulated 
monopoly to competitive market exposure. This represents a more complex 
form of public intervention than market adjustment. The assumptions are, 
however, that there is an underlying interest from both buyers and sellers to 
trade. The role of government thus is to facilitate organisation of the sector 
                                                     
7 From Finon, Johnsen & Midttun (2004) 
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under general market law, but not to involve in the actual creation of 
demand, such as in the green electricity market. An example would be the 
opening up for competitive energy markets. 
Competitive market organisation may necessitate more specific 
government engagement also in market design for specialised transactions. 
Public authorities may then add on to the general exchange regime, a 
specialised exchange regime, often to supply specialised supplementary 
facilitation of the primary exchange. Examples would be specialised 
functions in electricity trade, such as balancing power; grid access etc. where 
highly specific rules and market mechanisms are applied to vital 
supplementary market functions. 
The four regulatory approaches are briefly summarised in table I.1. 
The challenge of balancing policy learning and innovation processes 
probably increases with the deepening of the regulatory intervention in the 
market system and the degree of technological innovation that takes place in 
the market arena. The establishment of green electricity markets, apparently 
scores high along both dimensions as it represents an ambitious extension of 
the regulatory agenda and a heavy burden of design and control, at the same 
time as the regulated market is supposedly a dynamic one in terms of 
expected technological and commercial innovation.  
 
 23
Table I.1: Typical uses of market mechanisms in current regulatory practice 
 
Regulatory 
Approach 
Main focus Characteristics Example 
I  
Market 
adjustment 
 
 
Existing markets 
are adjusted to 
function better/ 
include new 
concerns 
 
Administrative 
restriction added to 
the general 
exchange regime. 
The restriction is set 
outside of the 
market system 
 
Environmental 
taxes  
II 
De-
regulation 
 
Opening up for 
competitive 
market exposure 
 
New sectors opened 
up to general 
market rules 
 
 
Opening up 
for 
competitive 
energy 
markets 
III 
Market 
design for 
specialised 
transactions 
 
Institutionalisation 
of specific 
elements beyond 
the standard 
market rule model 
 
Adds specialised 
exchange regime,  
 
Specialised 
functions in 
electricity 
trade: 
balancing 
power; grid 
access etc. 
IV 
Market 
design with 
constitution 
of 
preferences 
 
Institutionalisation 
of specific 
elements beyond 
the standard 
market rule model  
Actors and 
preferences are 
explicitly 
constituted by 
design 
 
Transfers the design 
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Concluding Remarks and Introduction to the Empirical Case 
Studies 
The regulatory design challenges presented above are each highly 
demanding, but even more so when they play together. There are some fairly 
obvious links between the debate over theoretical perspectives and the 
debate over the relevant mix of deductive and empirical experimental 
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analysis. When strong rationality is evoked in market design, it is usually 
done with explicit or implicit reference to the market-efficiency perspective 
and vice versa, the learning perspective is typically introduced with 
reference to technological development and dynamic efficiency. Similarly, 
the deepening of regulatory engagement is also likely to make policy-makers 
more directly responsible for distributive outcomes. The complexity of the 
issues involved in regulatory design of green electricity markets is a good 
argument for pragmatic empirical exploration. 
The following sections explore the challenges of green certificate 
market design in the pioneering Dutch green certificate market, the UK 
renewable obligation system and the Swedish elcert market. Each case 
provides a brief introduction on the basic regulatory design and the history 
of the market evolution. A presentation is then given of the basic market 
construction and the major actors and their interests. Based on preliminary 
observations and evaluations, the case descriptions also highlight important 
market outcomes and events.  
A final section brings out the major challenges and dilemmas to 
green market construction, including such issues as: efficiency and market 
competition; static and dynamic efficiency and learning curves; industrial 
policy issues and distribution between national interest; multi-market 
complexity; design variations in common green certificate markets. 
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Chapter II 
The Rise and Fall of the Dutch Green Power 
Market8 
 
The Dutch support system for green power has attracted much interest, both 
because of its new and challenging choice of support schemes as well as for 
its continuous changes in the regulatory design. 
The Netherlands saw the emergence of the first green power 
certificate market in Europe as well as the first green market to open up to 
imported certificates and therewith to pay a premium to green power 
generated outside national borders. 
However, the Dutch green electricity market also illustrates the 
challenges of a pioneering and unilateral strategy that ultimately had to be 
abandoned. 
 
From a regional based production subsidy to a ‘national trading 
scheme for green energy’: the Green labels initiative 
Before the start of the liberalisation of the electricity market, renewable 
energy support came from a mix of instruments ranging from feed-in tariffs 
based on avoided cost, direct subsidies, fiscal investment incentives and a 
system benefits charge.  
As a consequence of greening of the tax system in the mid-nineties, 
the ecotax or regulatory energy tax (REB) on final energy consumption was 
introduced in 1996. Renewable electricity consumption was exempt from the 
ecotax. Moreover, producers of renewable electricity received a production 
incentive from the ecotax funds collected from non-renewable electricity 
consumers.  
In 1997, Dutch energy suppliers concluded a voluntary agreement 
with the Dutch government to aim at 1700 GWh renewable electricity 
production by 2000, representing 3.2% of total Dutch electricity supplies. 
The target was proportionally split among the energy suppliers according to 
their share in distribution.  
An electronic green label system was introduced early 1998 to 
register green electricity generation and consumption on a national level. 
The green label system worked in three stages: new labels were issued, 
trading in green labels were registered, and finally redeemed as 
                                                     
8 By Karen Lagendijk and Monique Voogt 
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documentation of green electricity supply. Local energy suppliers carried out 
the green label administration and reported all data to the Central 
Registration Authority. 
The feed-in tariffs for electricity were gradually phased out as the 
electricity market is opened to competition in July 2001 and the market 
relied solely on tax incentives and certificates to support further greening of 
electricity. 
Principles of the system 
Under the EU renewable electricity Directive the Netherlands was allocated 
an indicative target of 9% of total electricity consumption in 2010. The 
Dutch government realised the limitations inherent in its geographical 
location when it came to the development of large-scale green projects. It 
therefore designed a scheme to encourage the consumption of green energy 
by Dutch customers, which also allowed import.  
 The incentives lay in an ecotax on the consumption of electricity, with an 
exemption for the consumers of green electricity with a reference to the 
polluter pays principle. By stimulating the demand for green electricity, 
Dutch government expected green generation capacity in the Netherlands to 
rise, but also to be supplemented by additional imports. 
 The market for renewable electricity was opened to all customers in 
2001. A new tradable green certificate system was set up for the verification 
and tracking of renewable electricity and to facilitate the trade and retail 
supply of renewable electricity.  
 One of the factors behind the great success was also that the green market 
provided an opportunity for energy suppliers to attract new customers 
beyond their former geographically oriented monopoly as well as new 
market players the opportunity to enter the Dutch power market. Where 
customer switching was otherwise limited by local restrictions 
 Since the openings of the Dutch retail market for renewable electricity the 
number of renewable electricity customers increased from about 250,000 to 
approximately 1.3 million in January 2003. This surge in demand was 
mainly due to the above mentioned ecotax exemption and production 
incentive. Encouraged by the success of the renewable electricity market, the 
Dutch government decided that it would seek to achieve its renewable 
electricity target on the basis of a voluntary market for renewable electricity.  
 
Instruments in the system: a dual incentive 
Renewable electricity was stimulated by a combination of consumption 
incentive (ecotax exemption) and production incentive (production subsidy), 
illustrated in Figure II.1  
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Figure II.1: Schematic overview of Dutch renewable electricity incentive 
scheme as of July 2001. 
 
 
 
Electricity suppliers collected the ecotax (REB) from conventional 
electricity customers. Green electricity customers paid a premium (€) for the 
green electricity but were exempted from the ecotax (REB), which offset the 
green premium. The supplier bought enough green certificates (GC) from 
renewable producers to match their supply of renewable electricity to green 
customers. Furthermore, based on the purchase contract for the physical 
power between the supplier and the renewable producer, the supplier could 
grant a production subsidy (PS) to the renewable producer from the ecotax 
revenues. The remaining ecotax revenues were transferred to the tax 
authorities, along with a matching supply of green certificates. The 
development of the support levels is provided in Table II.1 
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Table II.1 
Table 1. Regulatory energy tax, exemption for green consumers, production subsidy (€ct/kWh) 
1996-97 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021) 20032) 20043),4) 20055)
Ecotax (REB) 0-10.000 kWh 1,34 1,34 2,25 3,72 5,83 6,01 6,39 6,54 7,19
Ecotax exemption (36i Wbm) 1,34 1,34 2,25 3,72 5,83 6,01 2,90 1,50 0
Production subsidy (36o Wbm) 1,34 1,34 1,47 1,61 1,94 2,00 2,07 0 0
1) Hydropower excluded from ecotax exemption since January 2002
2) January 2003: 46,3 €ct, July 2003: 29,0 €ct2
3) January 2004: 29,0 €ct, July 2004: 15,0 €ct
4) 36o Wbm abolished as per July 2003
5) 36i Wbm abolished as per January 2005  
 
The ecotax proved to be an effective means for stimulating demand for 
renewable electricity. In particular from the moment when foreign green 
certificates could be imported to the Dutch scheme and a large flow of 
cheaper green certificates became available from so-called reciprocal 
countries (Austria, the Nordic countries, etc.).  
 
Limiting and Dismantling the Green Certificate Regime 
Because of the overwhelming availability of hydropower in “reciprocal 
countries” and its eligibility, not only for the ecotax exemption but also for 
the generation subsidy, the Netherlands experienced a huge inflow of green 
certificates from already existing hydropower plants. This led to a political 
reaction and in January 2002 hydropower was no longer eligible for energy 
tax exemptions, putting an end to investments in new Dutch small-scale 
hydropower9 but still providing some profitable opportunities for imported 
small-scale hydropower. 
 
Turning away from a consumption-based model, conserving a green 
market 
The large amounts of imported green power led to a large discussion on the 
success of the green certificate system. Critics specifically focused on the 
high loss of tax revenues leaking abroad and the fact that the existing 
promotion scheme did not result in much new renewable production 
capacity.  Another problem associated with the Dutch reliance on renewable 
electricity imports was that supply would be uncertain in the longer run, if 
these electricity flows are needed by the exporting countries themselves to 
fulfil their own national renewable energy targets. There were increasing 
doubts that imported green certificates could be counted towards the Dutch 
                                                     
9  Large-scale hydropower has not been supported by the green certificate system from the 
start of the system. 
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target, which would imply that subsidizing imports was useless. The Dutch 
government’s expectation that other EU countries would opt for the same 
subsidy scheme seemed unrealistic.  
Considering the critics and uncertainties, investors in the 
Netherlands started to anticipate changes in the support framework. The 
ecotax-based support framework could not provide the long-term revenue 
security needed for investments in new projects. In addition, domestic 
producers had to compete against lower cost imports.  
In November 2002, a proposal was made for an amendment to the 
Electricity Law of 1998 called ‘environmental quality of power production’ 
(Milieukwaliteit Elektriciteitsproductie, MEP) in conjunction with a 
lowering of the ecotax exemption and the abolishment of the production 
subsidy (36o Wbm). This proposal represented a shift in emphasis from 
demand stimulation through the ecotax exemption to a more production-
oriented scheme with technology-based feed-in tariffs in the MEP.  The 
MEP passed through Parliament in December 2002 and was implemented in 
July 2003. MEP is for national production only with a production start cut 
off date of 1 January 1996. At the same date, ecotax exemption was halved, 
aiming at a reduction of imports. In order to regain investment stability the 
level of the MEP feed-in tariff is fixed at the level of the tariff in the first 
year that the MEP was requested for duration of 10 years following the start 
of operation of an installation. The tariffs were differentiated according to 
the renewable energy technologies and sources. Figure II.2 provides a 
schematic overview of the MEP. 
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Figure II.2: 
Schematic overview of the MEP; the Dutch renewable electricity incentive 
scheme as of July 2003 
 
 
 
The change from a regime based on fiscal incentives to a regime based on 
generator subsidy also implied that the bulk of the payment was directly 
given to the producer, thus skipping the energy supplier out of the loop. This 
has resulted in much confusion since it required renegotiations of all existing 
contracts that had been established during the old subsidy regime or its 
predecessor. The government denied the market a transitional regime or 
guidelines to deal with those issues.  
 
Figure II.3 illustrates the sources of revenues for a renewable electricity 
producer under the different schemes.  
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Figure II.3: Sources of revenue under different renewable electricity 
support schemes. 
Main market players 
 
The Dutch green certificate scheme has involved a number of actors, 
including various government ministries and agencies in design and control 
functions. It has activated a broad spectrum of players, ranging from 
established energy companies to independent power generators, traders and 
final consumers that had to actively opt for the scheme. 
Government involvement  
The Ministry of Economic Affairs was the initiator of the green certificate 
scheme and has stayed in the lead for green power and its support ever since. 
It has however delegated most of the operational and implementation 
activities to the appointed Issuing Body, the Groencertificatenbeheer (GCB), 
later to change to CertiQ (both daughter organisations of the transmission 
system operator Tennet).  
Inherent in its task as Issuing Body, GCB was responsible for the 
infrastructure of the green certificates system, the control of renewable 
plants asking to participate in the scheme of green certificates, the issue of 
those certificates, their transfer from accounts to other accounts in the 
Netherlands or abroad and the final redemption of the same certificates, 
serving in turn for proof of green delivery to end-consumers. Its involvement 
within the RECS (Renewable Energy Certificate System) has also put the 
GCB at the forefront of developments in terms of international trade of green 
certificates. This involvement along with the RECS test phase has allowed 
for a wide array of countries for traders to choose from when sourcing green 
certificates for the Dutch market (France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Germany, Austria and Denmark).  
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As the instrument for stimulating the consumption of green energy 
was tax-exemptions, the tax authorities clearly involved. The tax authorities 
were responsible for checking the adequacy of the transactions performed 
under the scheme with the rules and regulations in place then. Now that the 
tax exemption system has been stopped the tax authorities are no longer 
involved and the regulator DTe has taken up their monitoring role.  
 Since the dismantling of the certificate system, the green market is 
now functioning without financial supports of any sort. Consumption of 
green energy on a voluntary basis, though most suppliers have held their 
price promises keeping green at the price of grey electricity. Since green 
energy is now being offered as a ‘special product’ within the marketing mix 
of energy suppliers, the regulator DTe is now charged with the supervision 
of the ‘green claims’ of those suppliers. This entails a control on the amounts 
of green electricity claimed to be delivered to end-consumers and the 
reconciliation with the amounts suppliers actually have sourced. How this 
control will take place is not clear yet as the DTe still has to publish 
guidelines as to green energy supply.  
 
Generation companies 
In parallel with the development of the green market, the energy market in 
the Netherlands entered in 1996 a strong wave of concentration, leading to 
three major energy utilities being created: Nuon, Essent and Eneco. Nuon 
and Essent, based on the inherited regional position, have been very active in 
developing their renewables generation portfolio, each with its specialty in 
terms of technology-choice. Essent profiled itself as a biomass producer, this 
mainly because of the co-firing possibilities that its existing production 
assets were offering. Nuon endorsed the image of a wind promoter, with an 
average build-rate of 100MW per year over the period 1999-2003.  
Next to the ‘historical operators’, a foreign entrant E.On, with the 
acquisition of production assets in the Netherlands, also played a significant 
role in the production of biomass. Along with Essent and other parties, E.On 
was signatory to the Coal Covenant, voluntary commitment from coal 
producers to insert a percentage of biomass in their power plants (or 
alternatively to reduce the same amount of CO2 via other measures).  
While all independent renewables power producers are contractually 
linked to one of the large suppliers, given the risks inherent to the 
programme responsibility, they represent a lion’s share of the Dutch 
renewables installed capacity. They have had much weight in policy-making 
via their effective and organised lobby.  
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Traders 
Next to the obvious involvement of large suppliers of green energy (Nuon, 
Eneco and Essent) and of the main producers, foreign traders have also had a 
significant involvement in the trading/sourcing of green certificates. We 
think here of Statkraft, Electrabel and Vattenfall, leading, in some cases even 
to establishment of new business in the Netherlands. While liquidity has 
severely dried with the abolishment of the fiscal incentives, those traders are 
still active in sourcing guarantees of origin for remaining green customers.  
 
Final consumers 
The Dutch market for energy consists for households of 7 million customers, 
of which 2.8 million customers have switched to green over the whole 
period. This number has not been showing signs of decreasing, with most 
suppliers setting forth their green-for-the-price-of-grey promise.  
Nuon made the first steps of green marketing with its ‘niche’ 
product Natuurstroom, launched in 1996, and offering its captive customers 
with an alternative to conventional power in the form of a CO2-free product 
(on the basis of wind, solar and hydro) against a small price premium.  
With the tax exemption scheme further democratising green 
products, the interest from customers swiftly increased together with the 
number of suppliers offering a green product. From ‘green energy in your 
mother tongue’ (targeted at minorities) to Shell entering the green market 
and marketing from its filling stations, the offer of green product was as 
diverse as it was short-lived. Most of those suppliers have now left the 
market or interrupted their marketing activities, as the margins slimmed.  
To date, only Essent and Nuon are actively pursuing shares of the green 
market.   
The system did bring about some very positive effects. Driven by 
the high levels of support for renewable electricity supplies and the fact that 
only the market for green electricity consumers was opened, the period July 
2001-July 2004 has been a very important period in the history of Dutch 
electricity demand. The utilities seized the opportunity to attract new 
customers in a market that until then had been fully regionally oriented and 
had not experienced any competition. Strong marketing campaigns were set 
up to develop a brand name and several new companies were erected to take 
a share in this new market. Green electricity became a new and well-known 
product in the Dutch market. The number of green power consumers 
increased enormously, peaking to approximately 40 per cent of household 
consumers purchasing green power (see Figure II.4). 
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Figure II.4: Number of green electricity consumers in the Netherlands 
(source: Greenprices) 
 
Conclusions and future development 
Future regulatory regime 
The Dutch government has made a commitment to renewable electricity 
investors that once they qualify for the MEP they are guaranteed a 10-year 
support from production start at the tariff fixed in the first year of receiving 
MEP for this installation. Thus, following the start of installation of a 
renewable power production plant and following qualification for the MEP, 
investment support is guaranteed for this plant. However, the tariff itself is 
not fixed, but yearly set for a maximum of two years ahead. Thus, new 
investments still face an uncertainty on the exact level of support as well as 
the continuation of the MEP scheme. These developments have created large 
uncertainties with respect to the actual realisation of the targeted 9% 
renewable electricity in the year 2010. It is interesting to note that when 
designing the MEP the Dutch government was careful to give sufficient 
room for existing capacity to be kept financially profitable to operate since 
this capacity is to contribute towards the Dutch target as well. This goes in 
line with the thinking behind the European renewable electricity Directive 
though many countries today seem to overlook the role of existing 
production in reaching the European targets. 
Interestingly, Dutch members of Parliament reintroduced an article 
in the 1998 Electricity Law opening up the opportunity for the Minister to 
revert to a mandatory share of renewables in supplier’s fuel mix (similar to 
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the UK and Swedish systems) in the case the supply would fail to catch up 
with the demand for green power. Expectations are that a new turn could 
take place in 2005/2006. 
A strong increase of renewable electricity demand 
Stimulation of the demand for renewable electricity has led to a large 
increase in the number of renewable electricity consumers in the 
Netherlands. Whereas prior to the implementation of the consumption-based 
scheme just 500,000 renewable electricity consumers existed, numbers 
rapidly increased to 1.3 million in January 2003 and nearly 3 million in 
December 2004 (out of 7 million households). However, with the tax 
exemption fully abolished and the opening-up of the grey power market for 
competition, the growing interest in green power is jeopardised. Already in 
the second half of 2004 the growth in renewable electricity consumers has 
flattened. The number of renewable electricity customers switching back to 
grey power is still limited as most electricity suppliers have engaged in 
longer-term contracts with their domestic customers and have made a 
promise to these customers that prices would not be increased during this 
contract term. At the end of this contract term it is not known how suppliers 
will decide to deal with their green electricity offerings.  
Continuous changes in support schemes 
The Dutch regulatory system for renewable electricity in the last years 
clearly can be characterised as continuously changing. These changes not 
only concern the design of support schemes, but also the market actors 
and/or policy makers involved as well as their exact role on the system (see 
Figure II. 5). The continuous uncertainty whether existing support schemes 
and tariffs would be continued and under what conditions have resulted in a 
strong reluctance on investments and stronger requirements from banks. 
After a considerable increase in green power production capacity in the 
period 1999-2002, production growth has shown signs of decreasing and this 
despite the intentions of the MEP subsidy.  
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Figure II. 5: Evolution of renewable electricity support in the 
Netherlands 
 
Future of the green market: production and supply 
 
The Dutch market for renewable energy is still a relatively small market that 
primarily needs a stable investment climate and a solid long-term market 
perspective before it will really take off. The continuous regulatory changes 
have done large damage in terms of bringing about new investments as well 
as new market players willing to invest. For the first time since the early 
nineties the share of domestic renewable energy supplies in total Dutch 
energy consumption slightly decreased 
Figure II.6 illustrates that the share of domestic renewable energy 
supplies in total energy consumption in the Netherlands reached nearly 1.5% 
in 2003.  
The share of domestic renewable electricity supplies in total electricity 
consumption remained stable at a share of 3.3. %. The import of renewable 
electricity decreased from 9.7% in 2002 to 8.7% of domestic electricity 
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consumption. Clearly the targeted share of 5% renewable energy10 and 9% 
renewable electricity by 2010 are not within reach. 
 
 
Figure II. 6: Share of Dutch renewable energy supply in total supply (source     
CBS 2004) 
 
 
 
Overall and in designing its future regime for promoting renewable energy, 
the Netherlands will need to take into account its domestic potential for self 
sufficiency and put it in the context of what is achievable for the rest of 
Europe. 
The Dutch market being too small to reach the targets Europe has set 
for it and a harmonised European scheme in which the Netherlands can 
source from any other Member State its own renewable requirements not in 
foreseeable sight, the Dutch government should grab the few and far in 
between opportunities of signing bilateral agreements with countries 
presenting a potential surplus that can be exported to the Netherlands. 
                                                     
10 Officially the targeted share for renewable energy in the Netherlands is specified as 10% in 
the year 2020. The share of 5% renewable energy in the year 2010 is used as an unofficial 
intermediate target. 
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Chapter III11 
The Renewable Obligation Order in the UK 
 
The Renewables Obligation Order (RO) is the central part of the UK strategy 
for stimulating the growth of renewable energy production in a market-based 
manner. As such, the RO is one of the few operative market based certificate 
schemes in Europe, with active plans for expansion both in time and volume. 
 For the UK, the RO is part of a broader climate change and 
renewables policy, where it interplays with other policy instruments. We 
have therefore chosen to give a brief overview of this policy context up 
front. 
 
Climate Change Policy and Renewables in the UK 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol the UK has to reduce its Emissions by 12% in the 
first Kyoto Period 2008-2012 compared to the base year 1990. Apart from 
Kyoto, the UK has set itself a more ambitious domestic target of a 20% 
reduction by 2010. So far, progress has been good, mainly due to a shift in 
power generation from coal to gas. However, with the continuing depletion 
of gas reserves in the north seas, the UK is about to become a net importer of 
gas. A potential rise in gas prices would make a further shift from coal to gas 
increasingly difficult. Apart from the abovementioned emission reduction 
target, the UK aims to source 10% of its power demand by 2010 from 
renewable sources.  
 
The strategy to reach this target is based on four market-based instruments:  
The UK emissions trading scheme was launched as the worlds first 
cross-sectoral GHG emissions trading scheme in April 2002. Direct 
participants took on voluntary absolute targets to be achieved on an 
incremental basis from 2002 to 2006.  These targets were, against a 1998-
2000 baseline, determined by a ‘descending clock’ auction held by the UK 
government.  An incentive fund of £215,000,000 was made available. The 
incentive payment is paid annually to companies once they have 
demonstrated compliance by holding allowances equivalent to or greater 
than the level of verified emissions.  The direct participants include mainly 
                                                     
11 By Nikolaus Kramer 
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companies from the oil and gas, chemicals, air travel, retail and mining 
sectors12. 
In addition, the UK also implements the EU emissions trading scheme.  
Furthermore, the UK also features the Climate Change Levy, which is a tax 
on the energy use of non-domestic customers. For electricity, this tax 
currently amounts to 4.3 GBP / MWh. If a supplier can show that electricity 
provided to non-domestic customers has been produced with renewable 
energy sources, he is exempted from the CCL. A part of this tax exemption 
is usually passed back to the generator. The CCL therefore leads to indirect 
subsidies for renewable generation. 
The Renewables Obligation Order came into place in 2002 and will be 
expanded on below. 
The Renewable Obligations Order, an Overview  
The Renewables Obligation Order (RO) is the central part of the UK strategy 
for stimulating the growth of renewable energy production in a market-based 
and thus cost effective manner. The RO separates the underlying physical 
power and the green value by issuing Renewable Obligation Certificates 
(ROCS), which are held in a central database as a proof of renewable 
production. The RO came into place in 2002 and was amended in 2004; the 
responsible authorities are currently carrying out a review with possible 
changes taking effect from 01/04/2005. 
The RO imposes the obligation on licensed suppliers to either source a 
certain and growing percentage of their electricity from renewables or to pay 
a certain amount into the so called buyout fund. The buyout fund is then 
redistributed to the suppliers who have met their obligations by redeeming 
ROCS. Monies raised from companies not complying is thus redistributed to 
companies that have met their Obligation, in proportion to the number of 
ROCs they presented in that year. This will act as a further market 
stimulation. Figure III.1 shows the relationship between the fulfilment of the 
quota obligation and the recycle value per ROC: 
                                                     
12 For more information and analysis of the auction, see the DEFRA report at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/pdf/trading-progress.pdf 
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Figure III. 1: Recycle per ROC13 
 
The objective of this redistribution is to create a direct link between the 
balance of demand and supply and the value of ROCS in a transparent and 
mechanical way as well as to put a protective cap on the costs consumers 
have to face for supporting renewables. In 2003/2004 for example, the total 
RO across Great Britain was 13,627,412 MWh, multiplying this by the buy-
out payment of 30.51 GBP gives a total cost to consumers of 415,772,340 
GBP. The timeframe of the system is currently until 2026/2027, with quota 
levels rising from 3% in 2002/2003 to 10.4% in 2010/2011, and the 
government has proposed a further annual increase in quota levels by 1% 
until 2015/2016. This increase will come into force from the 01/04/2005 if 
Parliament approves it. Table III.1 shows the respective obligation on 
suppliers: 
 
Table III.1: Quota Obligation14 
 
Year Obligation Year Obligation
2002/2003 3.0% 2009/2010   9.7% 
2003/2004 4.3% 2010/2011  10.4% 
2004/2005 4.9% 2011/2012  11.4% 
2005/2006 5.5% 2012/2013  12.4% 
2006/2007 6.7% 2013/2014  13.4% 
2007/2008 7.9% 2014/2015  14.4% 
2008/2009 9.1% 2015/2016  15.4% 
                                                     
13 Own calculation 
14 The Renewables Obligation Order 2005 Statutory Consultation 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/renewables/policy/roo2005.shtml) 
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The quotas are set quite high and the whole market is designed to be short at 
least over the first years. This is to ensure that fees have to be paid into the 
buyout-fund and thus the value of the recycle payment does not go to zero. It 
is therefore crucial to understand that payment into the buyout fund is not 
seen as a penalty, which has to be avoided, but as a legitimate alternative to 
redeeming ROCS. Without suppliers missing the quota the value of the 
buyout fund would be zero, thus devaluing the ROCS considerably. 
 
Further characteristics of the RO  
At a more detailed level, the RO features specific characteristics with respect 
to: banking, co-firing, buyout payment, relations to the Scottish market, 
eligible technologies and treatment of existing installations: 
Banking of ROCS is restricted, ROCS produced in the last obligation 
period can be used for up to 25% of individual quotas. This is meant to 
smoothen the effect of weather etc on individual years while preventing the 
build-up of large stocks of ROCS, which in turn could lead to extremely 
volatile prices. 
The use of ROCS obtained by cofiring biomass and fossil fuels is 
restricted. While cofiring is recognized as a form of renewable energy 
production, special rules and quotas on cofiring are designed to prevent the 
market being flooded by cofired ROCS which would then render ROCS 
from other technologies uncompetitive. 
The buyout payment has been set at 30 £ for the 2002/2003 obligation 
period and is increased each year with the Retail Price Index to protect 
investors from inflation. 
The equivalent for the RO (England & Wales) is the Renewable 
Obligation (Scotland) Order for Scotland. ROCS issued in Scotland are 
defined as Scottish Renewable Obligation Certificates (SROCS). The Office 
of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) administer both.  
There exist separate quota obligations and buy-out funds for Scotland 
and England & Wales, however ROCS and SROCS can be used against both 
obligations. This leads to a situation where the value of the same instrument 
(ROCS, SROCS) might differ depending on whether it is used against an 
obligation in England & Wales or Scotland. In the 1st compliance period this 
lead to the extreme situation where the same recycle value for the same 
instrument was 15.94 GBP in England & Wales and 23.55 GBP in Scotland 
respectively.  
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 The RO features a clear delineation of eligible technologies, 
including: Co-firing biomass with fossil fuels, landfill gas, biomass, sewage 
gas, on-shore wind, offshore wind and small hydro15.  
Before the RO come into place, the government supported 
renewable energy under the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligations (NFFOs)16 
requiring electricity companies to ensure that a certain amount of electricity 
generating capacity from non-fossil fuel generating stations was available to 
them in specified periods. Electricity companies in turn set up the Non-
Fossil Fuel Purchasing Agency (NFPA) as a vehicle to enter collectively into 
non-fossil contracts to discharge their obligations. The Fossil Fuel Levy 
collected from licensed suppliers recovers the additional costs. With the 
coming in place of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 
2001 the NFPA role changed. The NFPA is still buying output from existing 
NFFO obligations under long term contracts, now auctioning the power and 
the green value in the form of ROCS into the market, eligible to receive a 
potential shortfall via the Fossil Fuel Levy. The auctioning of ROCS via 
transparent online auctions with published prices undoubtedly has some 
merits for the market.  
To be eligible, the electricity must be physically supplied to customers in 
Great Britain. ROCs issued in respect of electricity supplied to customers in 
Great Britain, whether in Scotland or in England and Wales, will be eligible 
for the Obligation in England and Wales. 
 
Prices 
The following table shows the average prices achieved for ROCS in NFPA 
auctions, the average price for ROCS in the NFPA auctions has fluctuated 
around £ 50 during its history from late 2002. 
 
                                                     
15 The Renewables Obligations refers to the following technologies DTI/ Johannesburg 
Renewable Energy Coalition (2005):  C:\Documents and Settings\fgl86008\My 
Documents\johannesburg renewables policy.htm: 
Landfill gas, Sewage gas, Energy from waste, where only non-fossil derived energy is 
eligible. Energy from incinerating mixed waste is not eligible. Energy from the non-fossil 
derived element of mixed waste using advanced technologies is eligible. Hydro <20MW, 
Onshore wind, Offshore wind, Biomass, Geothermal power, Wave and tidal power, Solar 
photovoltaics, Energy crops, Co-firing of biomass with fossil fuels (revised proposals as 
detailed in The Renewables Obligation Amendment Order 2003)| Any biomass can be co-
fired until 31 March 2009 with no minimum percentage of energy crops.| 25% of co-fired 
biomass must be energy crops from 1 April 2009 until 31 March 2010.| 50% of co-fired 
biomass must be energy crops from 1 April 2010 until 31 March 2011.| 75% of co-fired 
biomass must be energy crops from 1 April 2011 until 31 March 2016. Co-firing ceases to 
eligible for ROCs after this date 
16 Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/renewables/policy/nffo_obligation.shtml) 
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Table III. 2: Average ROCS prices in NFPA auctions17 
 
17 October 2002 £ 47.13 MWh 20 January 2004 £ 47.46 MWh 
16 January 2003 £ 47.46 MWh 20 April 2004 £ 49.11 MWh 
15 April 2003 £ 46.76 MWh 21 July 2004 £ 52.07 MWh 
16 July 2003 £ 48.21 MWh 10 November 2004 £ 48.50 MWh 
21 October 2003 £ 45.93 MWh   
 
Actors and Market Structure 
 
A few large incumbents dominate the UK retail market for electricity; the 
same players therefore dominate the demand for ROCS. Figure III.2 shows 
the RO for the largest players during the first compliance period: 
 
Figure III. 2: Shares of suppliers in the total Renewable Obligation in the 1st 
compliance period18 
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6 large players who account for more than 75% of the RO dominate the 
market. This market structure has implications for the liquidity of the market 
leading to the following characteristics: 
                                                     
17 Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency (http://www.nfpa.co.uk/) 
18 The Renewables Obligation – Ofgem’s first annual report 
(http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/temp/ofgem/cache/cmsattach/6125_renewables_obligatio
n.pdf)  
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- The majority of trades are done on a bilateral basis for compliance basis 
and pure trading for speculative purposes is very thin.  
- Many generators are not prepared to take volume risks and therefore 
prefer off take agreements (possibly including LECS and electricity as 
well) to outright trades with a fixed volume.  
- There are a number of contractual structures being used to pass the risk 
inherent in the buyout mechanism back to the generator. 
 
New Capacity 
The process of planning, permitting, investment decision and finally building 
and connecting to the grid of new renewable capacity (especially in offshore 
wind) can take a few years, it is therefore difficult to say in which stages 
various proposed projects currently are. Since the RO started in 2002 it is 
difficult to assess how successful it has been so far in encouraging new 
investment. It is certain that the RO has encouraged a growth in co fired 
biomass generation as can be seen in the following graph:  
 
Figure III.3: Types of renewable generation in the UK19 
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Co-firing of biomass fuel in fossil fuel power stations is not a new idea. 
Technically it has been proven in power stations worldwide, although, until 
recently, it was not practised in the UK. The biomass fuel is usually fed by 
means of the existing stoking mechanism as a partial substitute for the fossil 
                                                     
19 Energy Statistics: Renewables 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/inform/energy_stats/renewables/index.shtml) 
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fuel. The combustion system may cope with up to a 25 per cent substitution 
without any major changes to the boiler design and airflows, but fuel 
preparation and transport systems may be the limiting feature at percentages 
much lower than this. 
Renewable sources are also used to generate heat. The three sources 
of heat production in the United Kingdom are: the direct combustion of bio 
fuels (97 per cent of the total), active solar heating, and geothermal aquifers. 
Together they produced energy equivalent to 662 thousand tonnes of oil 
equivalent, slightly above the figure for 2002. When this figure is combined 
with the use of renewable sources for electricity generation, renewable 
sources accounted for 1.4 per cent of the United Kingdom’s total primary 
energy requirements in 2003, up from 1.3 per cent in 2002 and 1.1 per cent 
in 2001.  
 
Experiences with the RO 
Shortfall in the buyout fund 
The biggest setback for the RO came from a quite unexpected side and was a 
problem nobody had really taken into account when the system started – the 
credit risk within the buyout fund. The supplier TXU was obliged to pay 
around 23 Mio £ into the buyout fund, but went bankrupt towards the end of 
the first obligation period which created a shortfall of 23 Mio in the buyout 
fund reducing the recycle payment for redeemed ROCS from an anticipated 
20.52 £ to 15.94 £. Thus the default of a single supplier reduced the value of 
ROCS by 20% and seriously undermined investors’ confidence in the 
mechanics of the RO. Two other suppliers have been unable to fulfil their 
financial obligations to the buyout fund since, showing that bankruptcy of 
suppliers is a very real possibility. The credit problem within the buyout pool 
has been recognised and there are proposals on the table to mutualise at least 
a part of this risk across all suppliers.  
Proposed changes to the buyout mechanism in case of a default 
To mitigate the impact of any further shortfalls in the buy-out funds, the 
following mechanism is being proposed: If there is a shortfall of 10% or 
more in the total buyout fund, a mutualisation process is triggered. If the 
shortfall is between 10% and 50% of the total value of the buyout fund, the 
whole shortfall will be mutualised, which means that every supplier has to 
pay in the recovery fund according to his share of the RO. This recovery 
mechanism is capped at 50% shortfall.  
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No speculative trading 
Trading in the ROCS market is mainly being done for compliance purposes.  
Nevertheless, the lack of speculative trading may be a sign of weak market 
credibility and trading restrictions. ROCS cannot, for instance, be cashed in 
without having a quota obligation. Thus it is always necessary for the trader 
to go trough a supplier with end consumers.  
The credit risk in the buyout fund is also damaging to independent trade. 
Many argue that there is a lack of transparency in the market as information 
is in the hands of a few incumbents. One can also hear the argument that 
prices don’t show enough volatility to attract traders. 
Regulatory Risk 
In addition to the commercial risk from shortfall in the buyout fund and 
possible liquidity and structural problems in the RECS market, there is also 
the problem of regulatory risk. This includes concern about uncertainty of 
future quota levels, concerns about overriding drivers behind government 
policy and concerns about overriding intervention by EU policies. 
No certainty on quota levels after 2010/2011 
Although the government has proposed to increase quota levels until 
2015/2016 this might not be enough to give investors and the financial 
community enough confidence on future revenues from long-term 
investments in renewable energy projects. As soon as there are enough 
ROCS produced to fulfil the quota on suppliers there is the danger of ROCS 
values decreasing dramatically as a) there will be no buyout fund to recycle 
once the quota is fulfilled and b) surplus ROCS can not be cashed in and 
expire completely worthless.  
Conflicting Industrial Interests 
In addition to national government and EU interests, UK Renewables 
Obligation policy is also exposed to considerable diversity in industrial 
interests. Renewable generators, such as the Renewable Power Association 
and the Wind Energy Association, are, for instance, pushing for ambitious 
policies and restrictions. Traditional energy-industrial actors on the other 
hand more inclined to support moderation and softer approaches, such as 
extensive co-firing where bio fuels are mixed with traditional fuels in 
modified conventional burners. Extensive co-firing allowances will increase 
compliance and lower refunding and thereby limit investments in new 
renewable technologies. Farming interests behind bio-crops may also 
support co-firing. Friends of the Earth therefore point to the effect of co-
firing reducing ROC prices and thereby switching revenue away from other 
renewable technologies, especially wind. The potential volume of co-firing 
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ROCs and the ease of switching between coal and co-firing will have a 
negative affect on renewable investor confidence. 
The problem seems to be that the Obligation mechanism may only deliver a 
limited share of the target, and that extensive co-firing will be needed to help 
out. 
 
Policy Drivers 
Government is engaged in a careful balancing act where it, on the one hand 
has made strong international commitments to renewables targets. On the 
other hand it is faced with the challenge of maintaining credible stability ion 
the market framework. If the rule changes are perceived as being made 
simply to enable the Government to meet its 10% target there will be no 
confidence that further rule changes won’t be introduced, which 
fundamentally alter the dynamics of the market if Government targets are 
not met. 
 This means that investors will need to make both commercial and 
political bets and thus adds complexity to commercial decisions, which may 
increase the hesitance of market actors to invest. 
Policy Influence from the EU level 
Regulatory risk is also enhanced as the EU commission shapes its renewable 
energy policy in parallel to national authorities. UK government is therefore 
restricted and influenced by another decision-making level, which adds yet 
another source of complexity to commercial actors. 
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Chapter IV  
The Swedish Elcert Model20  
 
The electricity certificate system was introduced in Sweden in May 2003, to 
stimulate generation of electricity from renewable energy sources. The goal 
was to increase the share of new renewable electricity with 10 TWh before 
2010, based on the 2002 level. Electricity generation from wind, solar 
energy, peat (qualified from April 2004) and certain bio-fuels, old small-
scale hydro, and any new hydropower projects, may under this scheme attain 
energy certificates. 
The introduction of electricity certificates implied a regime shift in 
Swedish support policy for renewables, away from fixed subsidies towards 
market based support. 
 
The Swedish el-certificate model 
The Swedish certificate model is based on an obligation for electricity users, 
with some exceptions, to buy a certain number of certificates, depending on 
their total consumption, their so-called quota obligation. For ordinary 
households the electricity retailer, in most cases, handles the obligation. In 
2003, the quota obligation was set at 7,4% of electricity consumption. This 
quota obligation will successively be increased, up to 2010 to 16,9% on a 
yearly basis. 
If the quota obligation is not met, the quota-responsible must pay a 
levy to the state. The levy is set to 150% of the volume weighted average 
electricity certificate price under the given certificate period (1. April 
previous year to the 31. March the year after). For 2004 and 2005, the levy 
was however fixed at 175 SEK and 240 SEK respectively. The electricity 
consumption is declared to the energy authorities March 1st every year. On 
April 1st, el-certificates corresponding to the quota obligation must be placed 
on the quota-responsible’s certificate account. 
 Preliminary statistic overviews show that about 7 million 
elcertificates have been issued under the period May 2003 until March 2004. 
These certificates came from around 1700 plants. The largest share of 
certificates came from bio fuel electricity production (74%). Hydropower 
stood for 18% and wind for 8%. 
                                                     
20 By Arne Jakobsen and Atle Midttun 
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 The quota obligation for 2003 amounted to 4.4 million el-
certificates. Only 3.5 million certificates were redeemed, which gave a quota 
fulfilment of about 79%. The average price of certificates in the first period 
was 216 SEK. 
Energimyndigheten (Swedish Energy Agency), registers eligible 
production devices and oversees quota compliance. When a facility is 
accepted, certificates are issued monthly, based on the electricity generated 
in the facility. 
Svenska Kraftnät, the TSO/national grid company, registers fulfilled 
contracts including number of certificates and price. Its main task as far as 
the certificates are concerned, is to develop and run a register of certificates 
and their owners, to issue certificates, based on the  measurement of 
electricity generation that qualifies for certificates. 
At the present, the Swedish electricity certificate system only 
includes generation in Sweden. The Swedish government has, however, 
expressed an intention to allow international trade in certificates in the 
future21. Norway is presently planning to introduce a similar certificate 
system, which is planned to be integrated with the Swedish in 2007. 
 
Estimated green power  potential 
The government’s estimate at the beginning of the elcert system was that the 
existing annual generation potential entitled to certificates was around 6.5 
TWh. The future potential for electricity generation qualifying for el-
certificates is estimated by Swedish authorities as given in table IV.1  
 
Table IV.1:  Potentials for domestic green el generation (TWh) 
 2010 2012 2015 
Wind Power 4.2 9 10 
Chp 4.5 5 6 
Hydropower 2.25 2.3 2.5 
Industrial processes 6 6.4 7 
Sun, waves, geothermic 0 0 0 
Sum “reasonable” potential 16.95 22.7 25.5 
Source: STEM (2004) 
Wind potential 
The so-called natural potential for onshore wind is by the Swedish 
government estimated to be between 35 and 70 TWh. The potential for 
offshore wind is estimated to be 100 TWh, limited only by the sea depth.  
                                                     
21 prop 2002/2003: 40 
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According to the Swedish energy authorities, the technical 
limitations to wind power are probably determined by how the electricity 
system may be balanced in a cost-efficient manner. The energy authorities 
estimate that the limitation may be around 10-30% wind power share of the 
total system22. The economic potential corresponds to the technical at prices 
around 45 to 65 øre/kWh. 
The largest practical limitation on wind power, they argue, is 
probably the licensing procedures, and the resource demand they put on 
licensing authorities. 
Bio-fuelled CHP potential 
The natural electricity potential for bio-fuelled CHP in 2010 is estimated by 
the energy authorities at 60 TWh. The span of CHP generation cost is large: 
between 46 – 61 øre/kWh. These potentials are based on the market 
managing to establish 20 boilers with an average capacity of 20 MW with a 
utilization of 4500 hours annually. 
A central condition for introducing a new boiler is most likely the 
need for additional heat locally as it is not probable that well functioning 
burners will be removed. 
However, the certificate system encourages fuel conversion and 
changed operation routines, that may provide added renewable energy input 
from existing burners. Much of this potential has, however already been 
activated. 
Hydropower potential 
The natural potential is estimated on the basis of Sweden’s 
topography and hydrology. The technical potential has been set to 130 TWh. 
The technical potential for increasing generation in existing large scale 
hydropower facilities, in a recent Government review, has been estimated to 
3.1 TWh and the economically viable potential is estimated at 1-2 TWh.  
Given the time-consuming and expensive licensing procedures, and 
the large opposition against increased exploitation of rivers, there has been 
little interest in exploiting this potential. The estimated 430 GWh additional 
hydropower until 2020 and the further 220 GWh beyond that is expected to 
come from increased efficiency in large-scale hydropower within the scope 
of traditional maintenance programmes. 
The same review has estimated the economic potential for further 
large-scale hydropower development to 5 TWh. The potential for small-scale 
hydro, which is covered by the certificate, is 1 TWh.  
                                                     
22 Given the integrated character of the Nordic power market, such limitations should be set 
for the Nordic system as a whole. Given a total energy consumption of around 400TWh, the 
Nordic market could carry a total of 80 TWh wind power (20%). 
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Industrial boilers 
The Energy authorities have estimated that the renewable generation within 
industrial boilers can be increased to 7 TWh until 2015. Generation the first 
12 months of the certificate system was 4.5 TWh renewable electricity. 
Based on existing plans, the Energy authorities expect generation in year 
2010 to be around 6 TWh. 
Solar and wave potential 
Solar and wave based electricity generation are less mature techniques and 
are likely to find a place within the certificate system only after 2020. 
However, the potential for solar and wave energy is extensive. 
The cost for electricity generated by solar cells is today estimated by 
the energy authorities between 3-5 kr per kWh and even if this cost is 
assumed to come down to 2 kr /kWh year 2012 and 1 kr by 2020, the 
electricity certificate instrument cannot be used to support this development. 
There is an estimated potential for commercially exploitable wave 
energy of 12 TWh in Sweden. At the present, prototypes are being tested, 
and the Energy authorities expect considerable wave energy to come on 
stream after 2020. 
Potential for bio fuel 
The increased generation in industrial boilers and in CHP that have been 
commented on earlier will demand large quantities of bio fuel. The potential 
for additional ecological, technical and economic exploitation of bio fuel, is, 
estimated to 78 TWh, by the Energy authorities compared to the existing 
exploitation of 125 TWh/year. It is seen as realistic to increase bio-based 
power generation by 3 TWh until 2010.  
 
Actors and interests 
 
The Swedish Elcert scheme has involved a number of actors both including 
paper and pulp industry, regional heating, traditional generators as well as 
new wind generators, energy suppliers and industrial and a few domestic end 
users 
Paper and pulp industry 
Swedish paper and pulp industry have traditionally generated electricity 
from waste products from the paper and pulp production. Particularly 
chemical processing with black liquor as a waste product has been used for 
energy generation, while also utilising the heat for industrial processes. 
Mechanical processes have to a lesser extent resulted in energy generation. 
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While energy generation from paper and pulp industry has served as 
part of waste management and self-supply of electricity, the new certificate 
market has provided a new focus on energy generation as an attractive 
business area. Paper and pulp industry is therefore gearing up electricity 
production and is building up further capacity. 
Energy intensive industry has a “zero” obligation initially, and with 
extensive gains from their supply side involvement for a number of these 
actors, they have thus seen major windfall profits. As an increasing number 
of other countries introduce similar certificate schemes (Norway being one 
of the first candidates) the industrial policy motivation reasoning behind the 
temporary quota exemption gradually disappears and hence one may expect 
a real quota obligation to be introduced sooner or later. 
The annual consumption of electricity for this segment is close to 40 
TWh, and exposing this industry segment to the quota obligation will have 
major implications on the supply/demand balance in the market for 
certificates 
Regional heating 
Swedish regional heating industry has also been one of the contributors to 
the elcert supply. The certificate adds on to the electricity price and makes 
bio fuel an interesting alternative to coal for this industry. We have therefore 
seen extensive fuel switching to profit from the new certificate market.  
Like for the paper and pulp industry, the certificate market may 
stimulate refocusing and motivate this industry to develop electricity 
generation as a business area. Some companies may be motivated to install 
electricity generation capacity in the existing heating system, and it could 
also motivate these companies to uphold production for electricity only in 
periods where heating is not required. For this purpose, they may develop 
cooling capacity to match the electricity generation instead. 
Wind-power generators 
Some wind generators may so far have had advantage from the Elcert market 
through transition regimes. The support given to this segment under the 
previous regime included 9 øre/kwh + environmental bonus of 18 øre + 
additional investment support. With the introduction of the elcert system the 
environmental bonus was gradually removed. The 9 øre/kwh  already 
previously removed. 
With the elcert model, this generation segment was introduced to a 
new support scheme more or less at the level of the old one. However the 
lack of a long-term certainty of the market for certificates has resulted in a 
more or less full stop of new investments decisions for wind power. 
However, the volume of new wind power developments that passed the 
 54
investment decision in Sweden was not very impressive, even before the 
elcertificate scheme was introduced. 
Hydropower generators 
Existing (by May 2003) small hydro-, as well as all new hydro production is 
also covered by the Elcert support regime. These generators received less 
support under the old regime (only 9 øre/kwh) and may be more easily 
accommodated under the Elcert regime. The owners of these generation 
facilities are typically the large el-companies, and to some extent the 
medium-sized regional electricity generators.  
Potentials for new, added capacity within the segment is limited; the 
main reason being strong opposition within Sweden to license further 
hydropower generation. 
Electricity suppliers 
As default demanders, electricity suppliers have not experienced a strong 
competitive challenge in attracting customers. The traditionally low 
customer focus on electricity supply has spilled over to the certificate market 
and allowed a comfortable profit level for this new market segment. In 
practice these actors have been able to pass on the certificate-cost to the 
consumers. 
Industrial actors that have opted for direct demand responsibility 
As a consequence of the sizeable transaction costs charged by the electricity 
suppliers, a number of industrial actors have opted for direct demand 
responsibility and are managing their obligations themselves. However 
during the first quota year, only a total of 64 consumers (industry and 
households) opted for and registered as voluntary quota-obligatory. Most of 
these consumers were supposedly industrial actors.  
Households that have opted for direct demand responsibility 
Very few households have opted for direct demand responsibility. Given the 
marginal importance in the personal economy, this has been a field for green 
enthusiasts. The energy authorities have estimated that a minimum of 25 000 
kwh of annual consumption is required for a household/consumer to profit 
from registering as a voluntary quota obligatory. However, this implies that 
the subject consumer is willing to “free of charge” spend necessary time to 
follow the market and contract certificates. 
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Markets/ Contracting and arenas 
During the late planning phase of the Swedish certificate market a number of 
established energy suppliers with access to and understanding of the coming 
regulations and market fundamentals acquired certificates for a price around 
100 SEK/MWh. The sellers were typically owners of smaller generation 
units (wind or hydro) that would loose the old 9 øre/kwh support and hence 
were willing to sell off at this price level. 
Trade was typically bilateral, between large producers and distributors, 
often within the same integrated company. However, OTC, or broker-
mediated trade also dominated this trade.  
Specialised brokers such as Greenstream Network and Natsource were 
initially major intermediaries in this trade, along side specialisation within 
the large Swedish utilities such as Vattenfall, Sydkraft and Fortum. 
The typical contract was a forward contract, based on meeting the annual 
quota obligation. Typically this would entail the producer providing steady 
generation for a period of ½ to 1 year on a fixed price basis. There are a few 
long contracts spanning several years. 
The generators effectively managed to “work” the market price up from 
a level of 120 SEK to approximately SEK 240-250 SEK/MWh (figure IV.1). 
This was done by partly “window shopping” through which sellers provided 
constantly higher prices on the sell side of the spread, and then often 
disappeared before closing deals, but also through active trading. The price 
level of 240-250 SEK/MWh corresponds well to the tax adjusted sanction 
fee of 175 SEK/MWh, and hence represented a price-cap for this period. 
More recently brokering has been taken over by large general power 
brokers like Montel, ICAP and SKM. The market price has remained at a 
level of 230-240 SEK/MWh, with the exception of an intermediate dip down 
to approximately 200 SEK/MWh. As we passed the deadline for reporting-  
and settlement of the quota year 2003 in end March 2004, there were 
expectations within the market for a price increase towards the level of the 
2004 sanction fee adjusted for tax (approximately 330 SEK/MWh). However 
this development did not materialise. In the spring of 2004, Nord Pool 
introduced a spot-product with a related financial settlement, but this has 
hardly been traded. The spot orientation replicates the regular power market, 
and did not meet the forward needs of the elcert market, given by the 
regulatory design. With an underlying liquid spot-market missing, long-term 
financial derivatives to provide an alternative to “physical” forward 
contracting were absent as well. 
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Figure IV.1: Price development and stages23. 
 
The environmental effects 
 
For existing wind power, the electricity certificates do not trigger any major 
increase in generation. The marginal generation costs are lower than the 
existing price in the regular electricity market, and hence electricity 
generation from these facilities, therefore, already makes sense. However 
incentives for optimisation of operations are increased as a result of the 
increased revenues from existing production capacity.  
For small-scale hydropower, the certificates represent extra 
profitability for, in most cases, already profitable generation. However, the 
certificates provide incentives to undertake maintenance and upgrading 
leading to increased generation. 
 Also for bio-based CHP, the certificates have provided extra income 
for already profitable investments, but have not led to any extensive increase 
in electricity generation capacity.  Some 1 to 3 TWh additional renewable 
electricity generation has though been introduced from generators that have 
switched to bio fuels from fossil fuels. High electricity- and certificate prices 
have made CHP generation profitable even in periods with low demand for 
heat. It is, however, by the end of 2004 estimated that the bulk of this 
potential for added renewable electricity generation has been exhausted. 
                                                     
23 STEM 2004, with adjustments. 
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Having stated this, it should also be noted that by the end of 2003 only 50 % 
of the capacity installed within the CHP segment is fuelled by bio. This 
means another 3 TWh of fossil fuelled CHP still in theory could be replaced 
by bio fuel. However this capacity cannot be completely fuelled by bio for 
different reasons.  
Concerns 
In spite of reasonable technical performance, a number of concerns 
have been raised about the Swedish elcert market. A major concern has been 
with the ability of the market to drive investments in new technology. In 
their second market evaluation, the Energy authorities remark that the el-cert 
system has not yet led to large new investments in renewable el.   While they 
do not doubt the capacity of the market to drive investments, the time frame 
needs to be prolonged. The five years perspective originally introduced is 
obviously too short. 
 However, the el-certificates provide sufficient support for 
minor investments, including activities that dominantly imply supplementary 
investments to further e.g. change in fuelling of already existing plants. 
 Concerns have also been raised about market transparency 
and strategic behaviour. A number of actors have complained that the non-
compliance fee has functioned as a price target. Furthermore that the 
unlimited banking availability has given the producers large market power, 
and that the non-compliance fee should not go to the state but to the 
renewable energy producers. Small actors have complained about the costs 
and complexity of trading and would like Nord Pool to take a more leading 
role as far as certificate trade is concerned. 
 Furthermore, the Swedish authorities have been criticized 
for underestimating production year 2002. A quicker and larger conversion 
took place than what the certificate inquiry expected, with a surplus of 
certificates on the market. 
 Further discussion of challenges and dilemmas of the 
Swedish certificate market is given together with the two other markets in 
the following concluding chapter on challenges and opportunities. 
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Chapter V 
Challenges and Opportunities 
 
In the introductory chapter, we have pointed out that, as a policy tool green 
markets involve a number of design challenges including: 
• Static efficiency considerations such as the need to convincingly display 
transparency, liquidity and competition.  
• Rationality considerations, such as how far such quasi-markets can be 
designed on a rational basis, as against learning by doing, where market 
construction becomes more of a learning process24. 
• Innovation considerations, such as how efficient promotion of mature 
environmental technologies may be combined with the need to promote 
less mature technologies that may need differentiated niche markets to 
develop their “learning curves”. 
• Distributive concerns, such as how one may avoid “unfair” distribution 
between nations and windfall profits to special domestic interests.  
 
Having explored the development of three green markets in Europe, we 
shall  - in this chapter - briefly sum up some of the most important 
challenges, opportunities and learning points under each of the major design 
challenges listed above. By way of conclusion, we shall subsequently 
outline some of the specific opportunities and challenges in designing green 
electricity markets on a European scale. 
  
Transparency, Liquidity and Competition 
When we consider the green electricity markets from a static efficiency point 
of view, competition, liquidity and transparency issues are particularly 
challenging, given the small scale and national character of most certificate 
markets. As shown in the preceding sections, concerns about competition 
have been raised in all three cases. 
In the Swedish el-certificate case, there have been complaints of 
limited transparency and strategic behaviour. Large parts of the trade are 
handled bilaterally, or through OTC brokerage, and hardly any volume is 
traded over the more transparent Nordic power exchange, due, in part to 
                                                     
24 This applies particularly to the complex multi-market effects arising from the impacts of 
the green markets on the underlying regular electricity markets. 
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deficient market design. Nord Pool’s certificate market has therefore, thus 
far, not had sufficient volume to become a central reference point for 
transparent trade.  
As previously pointed out, the price in the Swedish certificate 
market rapidly rose to the level of the non-compliance fine, in spite of over-
supply of certificates. The latest review by the energy authorities noted that 
there were concerns about possible strategic behaviour from the paper and 
pulp industry to keep up the certificate prices in a situation with a sizeable 
over supply of certificates. These concerns are raised even though the fairly 
broadly dispersed biomass generation has served to enhance competition in 
the Swedish elcert market, compared to other certificate markets (Bye et al 
2002). 
Final judgment of motivations behind market strategic behaviour is 
difficult to pass, however, as banking option allows accumulation of 
certificates for use under future scarcity and many thus motivate current 
under-supply of certificates. One could argue that the flexibility inherent in 
the banking option should not carry all the blame for deficiencies in the 
Swedish market development. It has been claimed that rather the sanction 
price mechanism is more to blame. Starting with a fixed and thereafter 
increasing price, and finally taking away the sanction mechanism all 
together, has motivated saving of certificates in order to cash in under future 
scarcity, that everybody expects, because there are few actors that dare to 
invest under a regime that only lasts until 2010. 
During the first year, with certificate prices at the sanction price 
level, the increasing sanction price may have led some actors to expect 
further price increases, and therefore to save certificates in spite of the 
problematic negative signals from a fundamental surplus of certificates in 
the market. This strategy has indirectly been supported by the Energy 
Authority (STEM) that has continuously argued that the fixed sanction fees 
have a price-indicating function.  
Serious questions have also been raised about the competitiveness of 
the UK ROCS market and it has been argued that competition suffers under 
the lack of speculative trading, leaving trading in the ROCS market mainly 
for compliance purposes. The lack of speculative trading is due to several 
factors, including the fact that 
• ROCS cannot be cashed in without having a quota obligation. Thus 
it is always necessary to go through a supplier with end consumers. 
• Prices don’t show enough volatility to attract traders. 
• Lack of transparency in the market with information being in the 
hands of a few incumbents. 
 
In the Dutch green certificate market, liquidity was more than sufficient in 
the early years due to extensive international trade. Allowing imports into 
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the scheme has definitively helped this liquidity beyond hopes. However, as 
the tax incentive decreased and were abolished, liquidity severely dried up. 
 In all three cases, practice from competition authorities so far has 
been to go soft on green markets, as they are in an initial build-up-phase. 
Nevertheless, there is probably a limit to how long such de-facto amnesty 
from competition law could last without giving rise to serious questioning. 
Like for the underlying electricity markets, internationalisation might be 
necessary to cope with the structural challenge. As green certificates may in 
principle be traded without any attachment to physical power flows, and 
internationalisation in this case would, therefore, not be limited by the 
physical system. 
 
Learning Versus Stability 
A major challenge in developing green certificate systems has been to 
balance stability and learning in regulatory design. We have previously 
pointed out that: On the one hand the depth and complexity of regulatory 
engagement in construction of the green market dictates extensive regulatory 
learning. On the other hand, short sightedness and frequent shifts in 
regulatory framework may also have a negative effect on industrial 
innovation, as it might undermine confidence in future framework conditions 
as a basis for technological investment decisions. 
 The challenge of dynamic learning and quickly changing framework 
conditions were particularly clear in the Dutch case: Startled by the rapid 
developments of the market, policy makers decided at a too early stage to 
evaluate and revise the market system. The market and its players did not 
have sufficient time to properly respond to the new market conditions. 
Consequently, conclusions were drawn based on incorrect market 
assessments. The continuous policy changes and even the threat of further 
changes led to an unstable investment climate. Combined with the lack of a 
clear long-term perspective of the Dutch government on the priorities and 
choice in the renewable electricity market this resulted in reluctance to 
undertake new investments.  
More specifically, investments were impeded because investors in 
green energy experienced: 1) lack of commitment and short-sighted reviews 
of the scheme leading to the conclusion that it was ineffective in developing 
new capacity; 2) lack of transition periods; 3) that banks and other financial 
actors distrusted the promised subsidies because of floating regulatory 
environment, leading to no-one getting financing without a power 
purchasing agreement being closed with an energy supplier before 
development (risk transfer to energy suppliers and traders); 4) that change in 
regulatory route at the whim of the government had left many stranded with 
their investments, like for example Nuon in Norway; 5) lack of a long-term 
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view on what the government really wants with prices being anyone’s guess. 
The effects of these dramatic changes in framework conditions is clearly 
illustrated by the significant reduction in the number of planned new 
investments on the Dutch market in the last few years 
 The English and the Swedish green electricity markets have not seen 
comparable dramatic shifts in regulatory design. Nevertheless, in both cases, 
there have been industrial concerns with open-ended policy positions and 
lack of long-term government commitment.  
 In the UK case, although the government proposed to increase quota 
levels until 2015/2016, this might not be enough to give investors and the 
financial community enough confidence on future revenues from long-term 
investments in renewable energy projects. As soon as there are enough 
ROCS produced to fulfil the quota there is the danger of ROCS values 
decreasing dramatically because there will be no buyout fund to recycle once 
the quota is fulfilled and surplus ROCS can not be cashed in and expire 
completely worthless.  
 Similarly, concern has been raised by Swedish wind generators that 
the time-horizon for the certificate period was too short and that uncertainty 
of regulatory change was too large to motivate substantive capital 
investment. The main volume of certificates has come from already existing 
bio-fuel plants that have undertaken marginal investments in fuel 
conversion. For bio-based CHP, the certificates have provided extra income 
for already profitable investments, and have therefore not led to any 
extensive increase in generation.  About 1 TWh extra electricity generation 
has, according to Kåberger (2004), come from generators that have shifted to 
bio fuels from earlier fuel mixes with fossil components. High el- and 
certificate prices has made Chp generation profitable even in periods with 
low demand for heat. It is estimated that this should have led to some 
0.5TWh extra electricity generation. For wind-power, however, the elcert 
model has implied a lowering of support for new capacity and a stronger risk 
exposure.  
Yet the complexity of designing markets with responsibility for also 
balancing supply and demand may necessitate considerable learning and 
adjustment. The government estimate at the beginning of the Swedish elcert-
market was that the existing generation capacity entitled to certificates was 
around 6.5 TWh. After the first year of the certificate system, the total 
production was 10 TWh.  It is therefore also understandable that government 
needs adjustment opportunities and therefore refrains from strong long-term 
commitments. 
Should the quota obligation increase beyond resources available at 
reasonable costs, one could risk dramatic price increases, given that the 
absolute non-compliance fine in the Swedish elcert-arrangement is taken 
away and substituted by a fine derived from the market price. The Swedish 
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government has therefore, as previously presented, taken great care to 
explore the resource potential for eligible certified generation and the 
potential for licensing them. All the same, such estimates are ridden with 
uncertainty, and illustrate the challenging task of taking explicit 
responsibility for defining market preferences. The fixed price ceiling in the 
first period proved to be an important balancing factor, yet rather 
paradoxically, given the large supply surplus. 
These examples illustrate that the challenge of regulatory learning is 
indeed a difficult one. Paradoxically, dynamic learning at the policy level 
may undermine innovative investment and learning at the industry level. 
Trading off policy learning and flexibility against stability is, therefore, a 
careful balancing act. 
 
Multi-Market Complexity 
The perhaps greatest challenge to a rationalist market design is to overview 
the interaction between the new certificate markets and the underlying 
electricity markets. Several analyses point out that introduction of green 
certificates through quotas may have effects on the traditional electricity 
markets that are not trivial to overview (ECON 2004; Bye et al, 2001).  
In order for the goals for electricity from renewable sources to be 
met by 2010, the electricity certificates must trigger considerable 
investments in new capacity. Such investments increase the total generation, 
which leads to a lower electricity price. A lower electricity price stimulates 
the demand, which again leads to increased demand for certificates, to a 
higher certificate price, increased profitability for renewable generation, 
investments in new generation capacity, and hence lower prices in the 
regular power market etc. The el-certificate system can be said to have a 
price-limiting effect on the basic power market, if the renewable electricity 
displaces expensive marginal electricity generation (figure V.1). However, 
this will have to be balanced off against the increased costs of higher green 
el quotas, which at a certain point will outweigh the price fall in the regular 
electricity market 
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Figure V.1: 
 
 
From a security of supply point of view, the increased generation from the 
green electricity market might have positive effects, although some of the 
new renewable portfolio might have rather fluctuating input. However, the 
resulting price fall could also limit investment in traditional technologies, 
such as gas fuelled CHP, that might otherwise have been built. 
 Recently, focus has also been on the unintended effects of Dutch 
certificate trade on the electricity flow between Scandinavia and continental 
Europe. While Scandinavia was experiencing power shortage and price 
peaks during winter 2002 and 2003. Dutch demands for green electricity 
imports to actually flow across Scandinavian and North European borders 
implied that cable capacity was reserved for electricity flows against market 
needs. While the electricity market dictated south-north flows, the certificate 
trade dictated flows the other way (Jess Olsen 2005). 
It appears that the complex interaction effects can only partially be 
anticipated by deductive analysis. Extensive experimental learning is 
therefore likely to be necessary, indicating that development of new quasi-
markets may possibly be just as adequately described as innovation and 
experimentation as by rational design. 
 
Green markets and innovation 
From an innovation policy point of view, the innovation challenge is that a 
certificate system with competitive price formation will, at the most, only 
stimulate the development of the most mature technologies such as bio-fuel 
and wind and may not further development of immature renewable energy 
technologies. Different green technologies are at different stages of 
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development. If the certificate market in line with static efficiency 
considerations only supports the most efficient green technologies, in the 
most efficient locations, this may create a lock-in from an innovation policy 
point of view. Immature technologies will thereby not be adequately 
financed and promising new technologies with a steep learning curve may 
never be developed.  
If, as indicated in numerous studies, including the IEA’s study on 
energy system transformation (OECD 2003) there is a need not only for 
research and development, but also for actual market application to develop 
operative technology, then also immature technologies need niche markets to 
be taken further. New renewables such as wave power or solar cells would 
need additional support beyond the certificate price generated in a 
competitive market for mature green technologies over a considerable period 
to develop their potential.  
Given the low risk/ low cost strategy of fuel conversion, compared 
to the higher risk strategy of wind power investment, one could argue that 
the market actors have responded soundly from a static efficiency point of 
view, and that exploitation of the wind power should under any circumstance 
only have come after saturating the fuel shift potential. Nevertheless, from a 
dynamic efficiency perspective, there is concern that a more long-term stable 
framework needs to be put in place for the more long term “next generation” 
investments to take place. 
 Neither the Dutch, UK nor Swedish green electricity markets have 
successfully developed differentiated niche markets for immature green 
technologies. Having problems with liquidity and transparency already, 
further differentiation of small markets to drive innovation, would be highly 
problematic. 
 
Green Markets, Industrial Policy and National Positioning 
Green markets are part of industrial policy and national positioning on the 
EU and international climate policy arena. As such there is implicit and or 
explicit expectation of national industrial and/or compliance return.  
 From an industrial policy point of view, the Dutch green electricity 
market had many flaws: The main mistake in the design of the system was 
that the one-sided market opening for imports left the Netherlands in an 
isolated position. Without any requirements for reciprocity foreign 
renewable electricity producers could enter the Dutch market while Dutch 
producers had no possibilities for export.  
A second key mistake was to rely too strongly on the interpretation 
of target setting in the Directive, without solid verification of this 
interpretation with the Commission. The Dutch government had interpreted 
the target setting in the renewable electricity directive correctly as 
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consumption targets. When carefully reading the text25, the Dutch 
interpretation in itself would seem correct, but it was in practice not shared 
by other EU member states26. Thus, while the Netherlands relied upon being 
able to account the imported certificates to their national target, the 
exporting countries regarded these certificates as representing part of their 
national production to be included in the counts to meet their target. Only in 
2004 did the Commission clarify that imported certificates could contribute 
to consumption targets, but then only if the exporting country had agreed. 
Such agreement was not explicitly negotiated with the exporting countries at 
the time.    
A third design failure was that insufficient restrictions were set on the 
inflow of imported certificates. Consequently, large import flows were 
achieved but severe doubts were raised about the quality of these imports. 
Electricity could be exported to the Netherlands from aging installations and 
other installations that had already received national support in their own 
market. In that way some renewable electricity generation was paid for 
twice. In spite of the fact that the support scheme was intended to bring new 
generation capacity on stream, irrespective of its location in Europe, it 
brought about much less new capacity than was paid for. 
 In the UK case, the more symmetric organisation of the English and 
Welsh and the Scottish market raised less industrial policy concerns. As 
already mentioned, however, there exist separate quota obligations and buy-
out funds for Scotland and England & Wales, where ROCS and SROCS can 
be used against both obligations. This led to a situation where the value of 
the same instrument (ROCS, SROCS) might differ, depending on whether it 
was used against an obligation in England & Wales or Scotland. In the first 
compliance period this lead to the extreme situation where the same recycle 
value for the same instrument was 15.94 GBP in England & Wales and 
23.55 GBP in Scotland respectively.  
 The Swedish elcert market remains restricted to one country. 
However, negotiations over expansion into a common certificate market 
with Norway are raising some industrial policy concerns. The calibration of 
the green electricity requirement over time is one such issue. Obviously, 
some symmetry must be established between the two countries on critical 
dimensions, in order to establish reasonable burden sharing. Industrial policy 
concerns have also been raised over unequal treatment of industrial groups. 
Paper and pulp industry is, for example much more favourably treated in the 
Swedish than in the proposed Norwegian regulatory design. 
                                                     
25 This interpretation is literal and intentional re the directive text – reading the footnote of the 
annex “carefully” could justify the misinterpretation that it is not a consumption goal or rather 
a production target 
26 The directive leaves it to member states to implement the intended consumption target, in 
effect, as a production target and thereby deselecting the option of internal trade. 
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Internationalisation potentially implies efficiency gains, as it allows 
exploitation of comparative advantages. However, this may in turn, create 
distributive problems, since the allocation of potentially competitive green el 
generation may not be evenly distributed across the participating countries. 
As national authorities impose the levy as an extra cost, there may be 
reactions if the industrial returns multiply in one country and are absent in 
another. 
 
Domestic distributive issues 
In addition to the international distribution of costs and benefits, the 
distribution of gains and losses, between domestic actors, has also been a 
major concern. 
In the Netherlands, creating a new product (i.e. green certificates) 
next to the physical energy has raised the issue of ownership. Regional 
utilities with long-term ‘feed in tariffs’ agreement with small producers have 
found themselves having to deal with these producers claiming ownership of 
the green certificate. This problem, although often raised by the sector, 
occurred once more during the introduction of the MEP, which re-split the 
subsidy into green certificates on the one hand and a ‘feed-in tariff’ on the 
second hand.   
 In Sweden, the debate over the elcert model focused on the fact that 
the transition to electricity certificates has had relative different effects for 
different generation technologies. The certificate price of over 200 
SEK/MWh has implied more than a doubling of the compensation to bio-
fuel and small-scale hydropower (Sandberg 2004). Actors with bio-fuel and 
hydropower facilities, such as the paper and pulp industry, have therefore 
been seen to harvest large windfall profits. Furthermore, critique has been 
voiced over the fact that the same paper and pulp industry is itself exempted 
from quota obligations. For wind-power, however, the elcert model has 
implied a lowering of support for investments in new capacity and a stronger 
risk exposure over time, while existing capacity has stood to prosper under 
generous transition rules. 
In the UK, one of the major debates on distribution of gains and 
losses has been the credit risk from the buyout fund. The supplier TXU was 
obliged to pay around 23 Mio £ into the buyout fund but went bankrupt 
towards the end of the first obligation period which created a shortfall of 23 
Mio in the buyout fund, reducing the recycle payment for redeemed ROCS 
from an anticipated 20.52 £ to 15.94 £. Thus the default of a single supplier 
reduced the value of ROCS by 20% and seriously undermined investor’s 
confidence in the mechanics of the RO. Two other suppliers have been 
unable to fulfil their financial obligations to the buyout fund since, showing 
that bankruptcy of suppliers is a very real possibility. The credit problem 
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within the buyout pool has been recognised and there are proposals on the 
table to mutualise at least a part of this risk across all suppliers.  
To mitigate the impact of any further shortfalls in the buy-out funds 
the following mechanism is being proposed: If there is a shortfall of 10% or 
more in the total buyout fund, a mutualisation process is triggered. If the 
shortfall is between 10% and 50% of the total value of the buyout fund, the 
whole shortfall will be mutualised, which means that every supplier has to 
pay in the recovery fund according to his share of the RO. This recovery 
mechanism is capped at 50% shortfall.  
Whether we are facing questions of green certificate ownership, 
windfall profits or shortfalls in buyout funds, distributive issues are likely to 
be particularly important, given the artificial character of the certificate 
market as a “political construction” The question of legitimacy both of 
procedures and outcomes is therefore critical. 
 
Opportunities and Challenges in Designing Green Markets on a 
European Scale 
 
Having recently initiated CO2 emission trading, one may ask why the EU 
should embark on supplementary trade in green electricity. The extensive 
EU ambitions in bringing about green transformation of the energy system, 
however, call for strong instruments and efficient resource utilisation both in 
the short and long run and there are good reasons to expect stronger effects 
from green electricity markets than climate policy instruments. Climate 
instruments have to be negotiated to meet complex multi-sectoral 
considerations, where least common denominator usually becomes the 
acceptable target among the sectors. Green electricity markets, on the other 
hand, can be calibrated to a higher performance standard, irrespective of 
other sectors. 
Besides the efficiency gains from competitive exposure in national 
markets, the major efficiency effect of certificate markets will be added only 
with international standardisation and market integration. 
Large European volumes also unleash learning effects on a large 
scale over large series and may therefore enhance innovation. Furthermore, a 
larger integrated European market for green electricity would allow more 
extensive market differentiation than closed national markets and therefore 
facilitate niche markets for immature green technologies, alongside the 
general green el markets. More fragmented national technology applications 
may not achieve the same learning improvement. 
However, large variation in green market design as well as more 
fundamental disagreement over policy tools makes the development of a 
European certificate market difficult to achieve. 
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Many challenges faced in our three national cases will also face the 
EU green certificate market. A major challenge with market-based 
instruments is that they trigger strategic industrial adaptation. On the one 
hand such triggering carries large dynamic potential for mobilisation of 
resources to reach environmental policy goals. On the other hand they also 
imply a risk of unforeseen side effects  - if companies develop market-
strategies out of line with public policy expectations. Some of the strategies 
from large hydropower producers to acquire windfall profits in the Dutch 
green electricity market are cases in point. 
 As pointed out in the previous analysis, unleashing of market-based 
investment strategies demand policy-stability and long-term commitment. 
The constant change in the Dutch policy framework and the relative short-
term orientation of the Swedish and UK schemes, have not yet unleashed 
large scale investment in build-up of new green electricity capacities. This 
has created a fundamental mismatch between the risk-positions of potential 
investors, and the long-term environmental policy goals. With the limited 
assurance of long-term policy commitment, the retailers are not able to 
provide the long-term contracts that are needed as long-term hedges for 
investors. 
 Presumably integrating agreement under EU regulation may be more 
stable, as the multinational character creates a lock in to established 
solutions. On the other hand, such agreements may be much more difficult to 
arrive at. The complexity of existing green electricity market designs are a 
strong indication of the wide spectrum of policy positions, even within 
market-oriented nations, and represent a basic challenge to market-
integration. On the one hand, the Dutch market has featured extensive 
international openness and has been consumer and demand side driven 
through the tax exemption and partly generation support. On the other hand, 
the UK market has featured politically induced obligation targets and a non-
compliance fine, which has driven the market.  
The Dutch market was, in its initial stage of international openness 
faced with supply abundance from extensive renewable supplies in 
neighbouring countries. The UK market, on the other hand was under-
supplied, in comparison to the obligation targets. This was done quite 
deliberately in order to have substantive fine payments go into the buyout 
fund, thereby providing incentives for development of further renewables 
supply. As the fine set an effective ceiling there was no danger of wild price 
developments.  
 While the non-compliance fine in the UK market sets an upper limit 
to price formation, the Swedish elcert system, is much more vulnerable to 
imbalances in the supply and demand. Since the price ceiling is set at 150% 
of the average market price over the year, gross imbalances could have 
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dramatic effects. Swedish policy-makers are therefore under strong pressure 
to set the certificate demand at a realistic level.  
 The UK and Sweden have also pursued widely different policies on 
inter-period trading. While the UK allows only limited “banking”  - 25% 
from one year to the immediate next in order to minimize the possibility of 
strategic behaviour; Sweden allows unlimited banking for the whole 
certificate period, and argues that this increases market efficiency. 
 Nevertheless, the likelihood of achieving international 
standardisation through market-based means is probably greater through 
market development than through political coordination of planned 
economies. As argued by Midttun & Koefoed (2001), the sequential 
alignment of regulatory market opening and internationally oriented 
industrial strategies may constitute a self-reinforcing mechanism for market 
internationalisation. 
 At the end of the day, such alignment should focus on simplicity and 
recursion to well established market models. As politically constructed 
markets, green electricity must, more than traditional commodity markets, 
stand the legitimacy test. Transparency, simplicity and recursion to known 
model may help provide the necessary assurance. 
 Well conceptualised symmetry conditions between integrated 
market systems is, as already mentioned, another necessary pre-condition for 
a well functioning European market. Without well developd symmetry in 
essential parameters, the Dutch case indicates how business strategies may 
undermine the trading system. 
 Given the loose federal character of the European Union, and the 
prevalence of strong planned economy tools in several member countries, 
development of green electricity markets will probably in its initial phases 
have to come about through bilateral agreement rather than by strong EU 
policy dictate. Only with successful demonstration of viability of 
international green electricity markets, will the EU be able to move on 
towards a common European market based platform. 
 With a few successful national regimes backed up by international 
industrial strategies there might be a possibility for a broader European 
market to take form. Many countries are going to feel a strong need for 
efficient greening and international trade when the deadline for fulfilment of 
their green electricity targets moves closer. 
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